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Abstract
The incentives of political agents to enforce tax collection are key determinants of the
levels of compliance. We study the electoral response to the Ghost Buildings program, a
nationwide anti tax evasion policy in Italy that used innovative monitoring technologies
to target buildings hidden from tax authorities. The program induced monetary and
non-monetary benefits for non-evaders and an increase in local government expendi-
tures. A one standard deviation increase in town-level program intensity leads to a 4.8
percent increase in local incumbent reelection rates. In addition, these political returns
are higher in areas with lower tax evasion tolerance and with higher efficiency of public
good provision, implying complementarity among enforcement policies, the underlying
tax culture, and the quality of the government.
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1 Introduction
A government’s ability to enforce tax collection efficiently is one of the fundamental com-
ponents of state capacity and, in turn, has historically been an important driver of economic
development. Tax evasion generates significant losses and distortions in government rev-
enues.1 The literature (e.g., Slemrod [2007]; Besley and Persson [2013]) describes three main
determinants of tax compliance: enforcement technology, political incentives, and cultural
norms. This paper illustrates the interaction among these three factors. We estimate the
electoral returns – the change in reelection likelihood – that local policymakers obtain from
a nationwide anti-evasion policy in Italy based on an innovation in tax compliance moni-
toring technology. In addition, we study how these electoral returns depend on underlying
social preferences for tax compliance and on local government efficiency in the provision of
public goods. To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first empirical evidence
concerning voters’ responses to anti-evasion policies.
Measures to reduce tax evasion generate a conflict between voters. The measures hurt
tax evaders, typically a minority of voters, while the majority of the population is likely to
benefit from additional government expenditures, lower tax rates, or even directly from the
punishment of former shirkers. For instance, a recent survey administered by Bank of Italy
finds that approximately 76 percent of the respondents believed that fighting tax evasion
should be among the foremost priorities for Italian public policy [Cannari and D’Alessio,
2007]. However, the magnitude of the individual costs tax evaders incur from enforcement
is potentially higher than the individual benefit non-evaders derive from it. Anti-evasion
policies are thus canonical examples of policies that are asymmetric in their concentration of
costs and benefits [Tullock, 1959; Olson, 1965]. Due to this asymmetry, fighting tax evasion
may either benefit or harm politicians who seek reelection. The sign of this impact is ex ante
ambiguous and, therefore, an empirical question.
In 2007, the Italian government instituted a nationwide anti-evasion policy, the Ghost
Buildings program. The program identified ghost buildings – properties not included in
the land registry and thus hidden from tax authorities – by overlaying aerial photographs
and digital land registry maps. The intervention detected more than two million parcels
1Slemrod [2007] states that, according to existing evidence: “the overall net noncompliance rate for all
U.S. federal taxes and the individual income tax seems to stand at about 14 percent”. Estimates from other
developed countries deliver similar figures (for Italy, see Marino and Zizza [2012]). In developing countries,
where the share of the informal economy is typically larger, the figures are much higher [Gordon and Li,
2009]. La Porta and Shleifer [2008] focus on the relationship between economic development and the size of
the informal economy.
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(the unit of the land registry) with ghost buildings.2 A large registration program targeting
the identified ghost buildings followed the completion of the mapping exercise. The central
government began the program and coordinated registration activities. Municipal adminis-
trations circulated information about the program, collaborated with follow-up inspections,
and enforced payment of overdue local taxes. Media reports highlight both the importance
of local administrations in the registration process and that local governments took credit
for the enforcement that followed the mapping exercise.
The program led to a substantial wave of building registrations. Administrative data
reveal that around 40 percent of the ghost buildings were registered by the end of 2011.
Total tax revenues increased by 472 million euros in that year as a result of the program,
with a large share of these extra revenues coming from local (i.e. town) taxes. The intensity
of the additional tax enforcement varied significantly across towns. In towns with a higher
prevalence of detected ghost buildings, the program was more likely to affect the amount of
building registration. We use a measure of Ghost Building Intensity, the ratio of the number
of land registry parcels with ghost buildings identified by the program to the total number
of land registry parcels in the town, to proxy for the scope of the program. Ceteris paribus,
there is a higher opportunity to reduce tax evasion in towns with a larger fraction of ghost
buildings detected by the program.
The data show that the increase in enforcement is stronger in towns with higher ghost
building intensity. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we test the impact of the anti-
evasion policy on the reelection of local incumbents by exploiting the cross-municipality vari-
ation in this intensity. Our strategy controls for time-invariant town characteristics through
the use of town fixed effects. It identifies the causal effect of the policy scope to increase
enforcement on electoral outcomes under standard assumptions that we verify in the data.
The results show sizable political responses. In local elections occurring after the beginning
of the program, an increase of one standard deviation in the ghost building intensity raises
the likelihood of reelection of the local incumbent relative to pre-program elections by ap-
proximately 2.2 percentage points, approximately 4.8 percent of the average reelection rate
(45.4 percent). Higher town-level ghost building intensity also lowers several measures of
competitiveness in local elections. In particular, it reduces the number of candidates running
for election, increases the margin of victory for the winner, and reduces the likelihood of a
runoff.
2Parcels are defined at the town level. According to the legal definition (Reggio Decreto n.1952, 1931),
they can vary in size, but they capture portions of land (or buildings) that belong to the same owner, are of
similar quality, and have the same usage.
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Guiding our empirical models are several retrospective voting frameworks of political
agency [Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Besley, 2007], which we adapt to study tax evasion.
Through these frameworks, we identify the mechanisms that can induce a change in voter
choices following a change in tax enforcement. Additional analysis of the actual building reg-
istrations induced by the program complements the reduced-form analysis described above.
For a given town-level program scope, a higher registration rate of ghost buildings has a
positive effect on the likelihood of reelection of the incumbent during the program.
We provide evidence for two channels that could drive the observed electoral response.
First, using survey data on the self-reported tolerance for tax evasion among voters, we
show that the program positive impact on incumbent reelection is significantly higher in
areas with lower tolerance for tax evasion. Second, towns where the government is more
efficient in delivering public goods show a larger electoral response to the program. We also
verify that towns with higher ghost building intensity experienced a differential increase in
local government expenditures following the program inception. Finally, we discuss potential
alternative interpretations of the impact of the program on the incumbent’s reelection. In
the first, the program changes voter behavior by providing information on the existing stock
of ghost buildings. In the second, it gives the incumbent an electoral rent by giving her the
option to not register identified ghost buildings. In the third, it changes the likelihood that
the incumbent mayor is elected to a higher level position. We use our results and features of
the institutional setting to show that these competing explanations cannot drive the results.
Our approach can be applied to different settings to study the political feasibility of
upgrading tax administrations around the world using new electronic data, cross-checking
technologies, and other monitoring devices [Bird and Zolt, 2008].3 Additionally, our analysis
points at a complementarity between technological innovations in tax enforcement and polit-
ical incentives. When exposed to a reduction in monitoring costs, politicians can exploit the
new technologies and experience political gains. Additionally, our study provides evidence
that the underlying tax culture shapes the political incentives for tax enforcement and the
political returns to these innovations [Torgler, 2007; Rothstein, 2000].
Finally, access to the program town-level nationwide administrative data allows us to
provide evidence on two additional fronts. First, we study the correlates of tax evasion at the
town level. We find that geographical features such as town size are important determinants
of tax evasion, consistent with Saiz [2010], and that social capital is negatively correlated
with tax evasion [Putnam, 2001]. Second, we document that mayors’ characteristics, such as
3For instance, other countries, such as Greece and Rwanda, have recently implemented policies using
similar technologies.
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education, gender, and age, affect the extent to which the Ghost Buildings program increased
tax enforcement (consistent with Alesina [1988], Besley and Coate [1997], Besley, Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol [2011]).
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, a recent set of studies uses
microdata to shed light on enforcement technologies such as third-party reporting [Slem-
rod, Blumenthal, and Christian, 2001; Saez, 2010; Kleven et al., 2011; Chetty, Friedman,
and Saez, 2013; Naritomi, 2015], paper trails [Kumler, Verhoogen, and Fr´ıas, 2011; Pomer-
anz, forthcoming], cross-checking [Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal, 2014], targeted auditing
strategies [Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2014; Aparicio, 2012] and third-party monitoring
of customs duty collection [Yang, 2008a, 2008b].4 Second, this paper is related to the political
agency literature [Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Besley, 2007]. Retrospective voting models
have received considerable empirical support, for example in the context of fiscal stabilization
[Brender, 2003; Brender and Drazen, 2008; Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce, 2012].
By studying how technology-driven enforcement policies affect policymakers, we build a
bridge between the political agency and the tax evasion literature. In addition, by delving
into the relationship between the incentives of political agents and tax evasion, our paper is
related to the work of Artavanis, Morse, and Tsoutsoura [2012], who find that tax evasion
is higher in industries supported by parliamentarians. Finally, our results provide support
to existing literature that highlights the roles of culture and social norms as determinants of
tax evasion, either via cross-country analysis [Torgler, 2003; Slemrod, 2003], lab experiments
[Spicer and Becker, 1980; Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 1992] or field experiments [Hallsworth
et al., 2014; Luttmer and Singhal, 2014].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Ghost Build-
ings program. Section 3 presents several conceptual frameworks that rationalize the impact
of a change in tax enforcement on voters’ electoral choices. Section 4 describes the data
and presents descriptive evidence. Section 5 lays out our empirical strategy to estimate the
electoral response to the policy. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Ghost Buildings Program
The value of the buildings registered in the land registry enters the tax base for several
national and local taxes, including ICI/IMU (the local property tax), IRPEF (the personal
income tax, which is both national and local), and the local waste management tax. Italian
4For a review of the literature, see Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein [1998] and Slemrod and Yitzhaki [2002].
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legislation requires owners to register new buildings at the local office of the Agenzia del
Territorio, the agency managing the land registry, within thirty days after their completion.5
In 2006, the national government approved new anti-evasion legislation, authorizing the
beginning of the Ghost Buildings program for the following year. The program was aimed at
detecting buildings not registered on the land registry maps.6 Italy’s national politics were
unstable during the years in which the program was implemented: Silvio Berlusconi (right-
wing) was the Prime Minister in the first half of 2006, Romano Prodi (left-wing) was the
Prime Minister from the second half of 2006 to 2008, and Silvio Berlusconi was again Prime
Minister between 2008 and 2011. Therefore, the attribution of the policy to one specific
national party is not obvious.
The Agenzia del Territorio coordinated the effort. The agency first juxtaposed the land
and building registry maps to obtain the Official Building Map. It subsequently compiled
high-resolution (50 cm) aerial photographs of the entire country to identify the ghost build-
ings. Appendix Figures A.1A-A.1C summarize the identification steps. First, the aerial
photograph of a particular location was created. Then, the pictures were matched to the of-
ficial building map for the corresponding area. Finally, the ghost buildings were identified.7
Ghost buildings include commercial, industrial, and residential stand-alone buildings, as well
as substantial extensions of previously registered buildings that should have been reported
to the land registry.
Through this process, the Agenzia del Territorio identified approximately two million land
registry parcels containing unregistered buildings. Beginning in August 2007, the Agenzia
del Territorio started publishing parcel-level data on unregistered properties in the Gazzetta
Ufficiale, the official bulletin promulgating Italian laws and decrees, to induce registrations
of the ghost buildings. Within three years, it coded detailed information on the number of
ghost buildings in the universe of Italian municipalities targeted by the program. The order
of publication relied on the availability of digitized land registry maps at the time when the
5See Legge 9 Marzo 2006 n.80 - Art. 34-quinquies. All buildings in Italy require a building permit before
construction can begin, and obtaining a building permit makes the new building part of the City Plan. The
process of obtaining building permits is administered independently from the registration in the land registry
maps. Buildings that are not in the City Plan are required to be demolished.
6See Legge 24 novembre 2006, n. 286 subsequently modified by Legge 30 Luglio 2010, n. 122. The
detection exercise did not cover one of the semi-autonomous regions, Trentino Alto-Adige, because land
registry maps are autonomously administered in that region. The region contains less than two percent of
the total population of Italy.
7According to the Law Decreto Ministero delle Finanze 2 gennaio 1998, n.28.Art. 3, the following build-
ings do not constitute part of the statutory tax base of their owners and thus are not subject to registration
requirements: (i) buildings that are incomplete; (ii) buildings that are particularly degraded; (iii) solar
collectors; (iv) greenhouses; and (v) henhouses or other buildings reserved for animals.
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program started.8 The Agenzia del Territorio had 60 percent of the land registry maps of
the Italian territory in digitized form before the Ghost Buildings program was approved.
After 2006, the Agenzia del Territorio began digitizing the remaining land registry maps,
proceeding by province (i.e., they simultaneously coded different municipalities in the same
province). It completed the identification exercise by the end of 2010.9
According to the initial legislation, owners could register the detected ghost building with
the land registry by April 30, 2011.10 Widespread media campaigns and local administrations’
efforts contributed to achieve high registration rates. In particular, local administrators
a) disseminated information about targeted parcels; b) collaborated on follow-up building
inspections; c) proceeded with the collection of overdue local taxes up to five years before
the program began; and d) verified the conformity of ghost buildings to the city plan and
local zoning restrictions.11 In addition, there is extensive evidence from the media that local
governments often attempted to take credit for the registration process [Langellotti, 2014].
In Section 3, we highlight this is an important element for understanding the voter responses
we document in this paper.
Owners of ghost buildings who registered prior to the April 2011 deadline were required
to pay overdue taxes dating back to 2007, or to the construction date for post-2007 cases,
and to pay penalties for delayed payments. After April 2011, the Agenzia del Territorio, with
the support of local administrations and contractors, proceeded with follow-up inspections
to impute the tax base for the remaining unregistered buildings.12 Additional penalties and
a fee for the extra inspection were charged to the owners of buildings for which the Agenzia
del Territorio imputed the tax base after April 2011. In Section 4, we describe the impact
of the program on the level of tax evasion.
8The identity of the owners of the unregistered buildings was not revealed and the program did not have
a shaming component associated to it. For the effect of shaming on tax compliance see Perez-Truglia and
Troiano [2015].
9Publication in the Gazzetta Ufficiale occurred in the following waves: August 2007, October 2007, De-
cember 2007, December 2008, December 2009, December 2010.
10This was after extending on two previous deadlines of ninety days and seven months since the publication
in the Gazzetta Ufficiale, respectively.
11Registration in the land registry does not imply that the building is waived from zoning restrictions.
12To further increase incentives for the local administrations, an additional bonus was introduced in 2011
for each registered ghost building. See also Decreto Legge 79/2010, art. 10, 11.
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3 Tax Enforcement and Retrospective Voting: Con-
ceptual Frameworks
This section presents several conceptual frameworks that rationalize the impact of a
change in tax enforcement on voters’ electoral choices. Through verbal presentation of these
models, we show that the program can affect voter behavior through its impact on tax
enforcement by changing the voter inference about the politician type and by reducing un-
certainty about it. We also highlight the role of voters’ information in shaping the electoral
response. Analytical details are provided in the Theory Appendix.
The frameworks are based on the modeling of retrospective voting [Barro, 1973; Ferejohn,
1986] and tax evasion [Allingham and Sandmo, 1972]. The main intuition of retrospective
voting models is that citizens decide whether to reelect the incumbent based on their welfare
in the most recent political term.13 The various conceptual frameworks share several features.
In all the models we adopt a standard probabilistic voting approach [Lindbeck and Weibull,
1987]. Voters are heterogeneous in their ability to evade. This ability could be a function
of the psychological and physical costs of evading. We consider a simple case with two fixed
types of voters: evaders and non-evaders. Evaders pay taxes only if enforcement occurs,
while non-evaders always pay taxes. Enforcement depends both on the politician (type and
effort) and on a noise. Voters do not observe the two components and are uncertain over the
politician type, as in Banks and Sundaram [1998]. They use previous realizations to form
expectations about the politician, in the spirit of Holmstrom [1982].
Voters derive utility from disposable income and from the overall level of enforcement,
for instance, through the increased provision of public goods and deficit reduction. This
implies that enforcement has two effects on evaders’ utility, which go in opposite directions.
First, enforcement decreases the disposable income for evaders. Second, cracking down on
tax evasion increases the size of the government, which benefits all citizens, including evaders.
Non-evaders also obtain an additional non-monetary benefit from enforcement. One example
is the case where, because of fairness concerns, non-evaders derive direct utility from the
enforcement of evaders’ tax payments, independent of their monetary returns.14 As a result of
these channels, an increase in enforcement will have an ambiguous impact on voter welfare and
13For empirical applications based on the retrospective voting model framework see: Brender [2003]; Besley
and Pratt [2006]; Brender and Drazen [2008]; Ferraz and Finan [2008]; Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce [2012];
Nannicini, Stella, Tabellini and Troiano [2013]; Drago, Nannicini and Sobbrio [2014].
14For experimental evidence on this channel, see Carpenter et al. [2009]; Casari and Luini [2009]; Ouss
and Peysakhovich [2012].
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voting behavior. In addition, the net benefits of an increase in government will intuitively be
larger when government efficiency in public good provision and the intensity of non-monetary
benefits from the additional enforcement are higher.
We now turn to the specific features of each framework. In the first conceptual frame-
work, the Ghost Buildings program is modeled as a positive shock to enforcement. Voters
observe the increase in building registrations but have limited information about the specific
“production function” of enforcement (i.e., information collected by the central government,
the efforts of local administrations, and complementarity between the two sources). This in
turn increases the belief they hold about the enforcement propensity of the local incumbent
type. Models with rational but poorly informed voters have received growing attention in the
literature [Wolfers, 2009; Cole, Healy, and Werker, 2013; Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito,
2011; Pande, 2011]. Poor voter information is particularly relevant for the Ghost Buildings
program. It was likely difficult for voters to make inferences about who exactly was ramp-
ing up enforcement. Local administrations’ efforts complemented the initial identification
process. In addition, evidence from media reports and town bulletins suggest that mayors
often took credit for the enforcement following the program, and in some cases, even for the
initial stages of building identification through aerial pictures.15 Consistent with the logic
described in the previous paragraph, the change in beliefs about the incumbent enforcement
type generates an ambiguous effect on her reelection likelihood, heterogeneous in government
efficiency and in the non-monetary benefits from enforcement for non-evaders.
In the second conceptual framework, which is heavily based on the model of political
agency in Besley [2007], the Ghost Buildings program reduces the cost of enforcement for
the local incumbent. Unlike the previous model, voters have perfect information about
this change. In this model, politicians have heterogeneous preferences over enforcement.
Enforcement is costly for politicians, and politicians gain an ego-rent from re-election. The
cost reduction caused by the program can enable more pro-enforcement types (i.e., those
who derive direct utility from increasing enforcement) to reveal their type through their now
cheaper enforcement choice. The effect of an average increase in the enforcement level under
the incumbent has again ambiguous predictions on election outcomes. The heterogeneities
described above continue to hold.
Finally, in the third framework, we model the Ghost Buildings program as a change
that, while leaving unchanged the average beliefs voters hold about the incumbent, reduces
their dispersion. The main intuition is that the program allows the incumbent mayor to
15Some examples include Barca [2008], Bernardini [2011], Cavallaro [2011], Corriere della Citta` [2012],
Dell’Oste and Trovati [2011], Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno [2012].
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better reveal their true type, as mayors who are in office when the program starts have the
opportunity to be observed both in the state of the world with the program and in the one
without the program. In the presence of voters with risk-averse preferences, this will lead
to an increase in reelection rates. In addition, under standard additional assumptions, it is
possible to derive again the heterogeneities by government efficiency and by the level of non-
monetary benefits non-evaders obtain from enforcement. In the empirical analysis, we do not
aim at differentiating these models. Rather, the fact that all of the frameworks predict an
ambiguous electoral effect of the program shows how uncovering the electoral consequences
of the program is an empirical question, which does not depend on the specific modeling
assumptions.
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
4.1 Data
The main database for the analysis includes information on the number of parcels con-
taining ghost buildings in each town. The aerial photographs detected more than two million
such parcels. We target the population of 7,720 of the 8,092 Italian towns for which we can
define the measure of ghost building intensity. Additionally, we obtain data on registered
ghost buildings by the deadline of April 30, 2011. These allow us to define the ghost build-
ing registration rate as the percentage of ghost building parcels that were registered by the
April 2011 deadline. To analyze the electoral response to ghost building registration, we also
construct a measure of registration imputable to the incumbent administration. Specifically,
we multiply the registration rate by the ratio between a) the time elapsed between program
start date and election date and b) the time elapsed between program start date and April
2011.
We complement this information with data from the Italian Department of the Interior
(Ministero degli Interni) on the universe of municipal elections from 1993 to 2011. In Figure
I, we plot the number of elections per year. Towns vote in different years according to
predetermined waves. We distinguish between elections before and after the beginning of
the Ghost Buildings program. There are almost 5,200 municipalities for which we have data
on an election that occurred after program inception (approximately 67 percent of the total
number of towns targeted by the program). Two institutional reforms that occurred in the
time span of our sample were relevant. First, in 1993, the starting year for our election
sample, Italian municipal politics were overhauled: a new electoral law changed the mayoral
9
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electoral system from party to individual ballot. Municipalities below 15,000 inhabitants
adopt a single round system, while a runoff system is in place above this threshold.16 The
1993 reform also introduced a two-term limit. Second, in 2000, the length of the mayoral
term was extended from four to five years.17
In addition to the core data, we collect geographic and socio-economic data at the munic-
ipality level from the Italian National Statistical Office. Finally, we use two additional data
sources to test the channels driving the electoral response: town-level government expendi-
tures (from the Ministero degli Interni) and a region-level standardized score to the question
“Do you justify tax cheating?” from the European Values Study for each of the 19 Italian
regions included in the program. Table I presents summary statistics for the variables used
in the paper. Panel A presents the main variables related to the Ghost Buildings program.
Panels B and C include town-level geographical and socio-economic covariates, respectively.
These are measured prior to the inception of the Ghost Buildings program, mostly in the
2001 Population Census. Panel D summarizes the characteristics of the mayor in office at
the time of the program inception in a particular town.18 In Panel E, we summarize the local
election panel variables. Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 provide a detailed description of data
sources and variable definitions.
4.2 The Correlates of Tax Evasion
We use data from the Ghost Buildings program to study the correlates of tax evasion
at the town level. Figure II presents our measure of ghost building intensity across Italian
towns. Notably, ghost buildings are more prevalent in Southern Italy, and less widespread
in the North.19 Table II presents the correlates of ghost building intensity (per 1,000 land
16Bordignon, Nannicini, and Tabellini [2013] show that under runoff elections, the number of political
candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy is smaller.
17In limited cases, the term can last less than is provided by the law and elections can take place earlier.
Those limited cases include the resignation of the mayor, the resignation of the majority of the council or
a no-confidence vote in the council. Early termination is relatively infrequent in Italian local politics. In
the post-program period, only approximately 7 percent of the towns experience an early termination of the
mayor’s term and for only 2.5 percent of the towns is the difference between the natural expiration of the term
and the actual expiration of the term larger than one year. Consistent with the previous points, we verify
that our results are not affected when we drop the sample of towns with an election year in the post-program
period that is different from the one scheduled by the law.
18Only about half of mayors are matched to national parties, and the other parties are difficult to categorize
within a left-right spectrum. We therefore choose not to focus on this variable in our analysis. We note that
adding political party dummies to the controls in the regressions (for those mayors for which we have this
information) does not affect the results we present later in the paper.
19The Agenzia del Territorio conducted its detection activities homogeneously throughout the country.
Thus, heterogeneity in the number of detected unregistered buildings captures differences in actual levels
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registry parcels). In Column (1), we first study whether geographical factors (altitude, area
of the town, number of land registry parcels) are correlated with tax evasion. In Column
(2), we add socio-economic controls (population, income per capita, social capital, number
of firms, urbanization rate). Finally, in Column (3), we show that our results are unaffected
by the inclusion of regional fixed effects.20
We find that several geographic characteristics are strongly associated with tax evasion.
In particular, controlling for other variables, tax evasion is higher in geographically larger
municipalities. Plausibly, in cities with wide geographical extension, there are greater op-
portunities to hide unregistered buildings as the enforcement of building registration is more
difficult and resource-intensive. However, we cannot decisively interpret this evidence as
causal. Previous literature has shown, for example, that borders are endogenously deter-
mined (see, e.g., Alesina and Spolaore [1997], Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby [2004], Alesina,
Easterly, and Matuszeski [2011]). Finally, as expected, tax evasion is negatively associated
with both social capital and income. In particular, the finding on social capital is consis-
tent with Putnam [2001], who finds that the percentage of tax evasion, as measured by the
Internal Revenue Service, is strongly related to differences in social capital at the state level.
4.3 The Ghost Building Registration Outcomes
In this section, we provide details on the wave of registration of ghost buildings induced
by the program. Administrative data reveal that 40 percent of the ghost buildings were
registered by the end of 2011. The Agenzia del Territorio estimates that in 2011 total tax
revenues increased by 472 million euros as a result of the program [Agenzia del Territorio
and Dipartmento delle Finanze, 2012].21
Local administrations receive a large share of the additional tax revenues generated by
the program, and we estimate that approximately 65 percent of those revenues are generated
by local taxes. We then run a back-of-the-envelope calculation using figures on the number
of land parcels with ghost buildings, the registration rates, and the total additional tax
revenues from the program. A one standard deviation increase in ghost buildings targeted
by the program will increase local tax revenues by approximately 3 percent of the median
of non-registration at the time of the aerial photographing, as opposed to differential intensity in detection
activity.
20For 3.5 percent of the towns in our sample we are missing at least one town-level control. In our regressions
throughout the paper, for each control we include a binary indicator which is equal to one if the control is
missing. In addition, we replace missing values with an arbitrary unique value.
21This figure does not include payments for overdue taxes from previous years.
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value. Using the same information, we calculate that, on average, the owner of a registered
ghost building will face an additional yearly tax burden of approximately 528 Euros.
In section 6.2, when discussing the potential channels driving an electoral response, we also
document that the program had a commensurate impact on local government expenditures.
A potential additional margin of adjustment in response to the higher level of compliance
could potentially be a reduction in tax rates. However, we note that tax rates exhibit very
little variation after the program, mainly because of a law that introduced tax rate freezes
(Legge 22 Dicembre 2008, n. 203). Specifically, we find that only 1 percent of the Italian
towns move the property tax rate in any given year after 2008 and around 0.5 percent of towns
move the municipal income tax rate in the same period. Consistent with this explanation,
we do not find evidence of responses of tax rates to the program.
We then look at the ghost building registration rate. Figure III documents substantial
dispersion across towns: the coefficient of variation in the registration rates takes a high value
of 0.75.22 Table III documents the impact of the characteristics of the mayor at the time of the
program inception on this outcome. For a given level of the other covariates, the registration
rate is higher when mayors are male, younger, more educated, or were born in the same
city in which they serve as mayor. The correlation between gender and policies in Italian
municipality is broadly consistent with the results of Gagliarducci and Paserman [2012], who
find that female policymakers usually face greater difficulty in implementing policies while in
office. To the extent that education can be considered a proxy for politicians’ quality (see,
for example, Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2011]), this set of results also supports the
view that better policymakers fight tax evasion more. We highlight the correlation between
the mayor’s birthplace and tax evasion enforcement. One possible explanation is that mayors
born in the city care more about their birthplace, for instance because relatives and friends
could be harmed by low resources available to the municipality. Another one could be that
they have access to additional information that can facilitate tax evasion enforcement.
We acknowledge that this evidence relies on cross-sectional correlation analysis and thus
should be interpreted with caution. However, we also notice that the results are robust to the
inclusion of geographical controls, in Column (2) and then to the further inclusion of socio-
economic controls, in Column (3). With these caveats in mind, the findings of this section
suggest that the mayors’ characteristics did have a role in shaping registration activities
across towns.
Finally, we show that the number of ghost buildings detected by the program is a good
22In 5.8 percent of the towns with a positive number of ghost buildings, none of the detected ghost buildings
was registered by April 2011.
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predictor of the number of ghost buildings that were registered in response to the policy.
Figure IV displays the relationship between the number of land parcels with ghost buildings
eventually registered by the April 2011 deadline and the number of parcels that were identified
as containing ghost buildings, both as a share of the total number of land registry parcels. In
the graph, the x-axis variable is partitioned into percentiles. The scatter plot shows a clear
increasing relationship. In a linear regression analysis, an increase of one standard deviation
in the detected intensity of ghost buildings raises the intensity of registered ghost buildings at
April 2011 by approximately 0.75 standard deviations (p < 0.01). To summarize, the program
scope at the town-level strongly predicts the program actual impact on tax enforcement. This
premise motivates the strategy that we adopt to estimate the impact of the Ghost Buildings
program on electoral outcomes, which we introduce in the next section.
5 Empirical Strategy
5.1 The Electoral Response to the Ghost Buildings Program
In this section, we outline our approach to estimate the voter response to the Ghost
Buildings program. Our empirical strategy exploits variation across towns in the program
scope to increase tax enforcement. We implement a difference-in-differences approach based
on town-level ghost building intensity.
In Section 4.3, we documented that mayors’ characteristics, such as age, education, and
gender, predict the registration rate of the detected ghost buildings. However, the actual
levels of registration could depend on voter preferences and responsiveness to the program.
Thus, a naive analysis examining the relationship between actual ghost building registrations
and reelection outcomes will suffer from standard omitted variable bias. This motivates our
focus on ex ante program scope to measure the impact of enforcement.
The rationale for our identification approach is that the program scope at the town level
predicts the exogenous increase in enforcement induced by the Ghost Buildings program, as
shown in Figure IV. Towns with a higher share of parcels containing detected ghost buildings
also have, on average, a higher share of parcels with registered ghost buildings, as measured
in April 2011. In a recent contribution, Mian and Sufi [2012] adopted a similar empirical
approach to study the effects of the fiscal stimulus in the United States.
Importantly the intensity of ghost buildings is not a valid instrument for actual regis-
tration intensity. The program can affect incumbent reelection probability through other
channels besides registration. For instance, it may give mayors an opportunity to extract
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rents from low program enforcement or by providing voters with information regarding past
enforcement. In section 6.3, we discuss these alternative interpretations and show that they
cannot drive our results. However, it could still be the case that these alternative mechanisms
partially affected the voter response, which would violate the standard exclusion restriction
required for an instrumental variable approach.23
Our baseline specification is therefore:
Rimet = β0 + β1Postie ·Ghost Building Intensityi + ηm · Postie + φi + φt + imet (1)
The dependent variable Rimet is a dummy that indicates whether the incumbent of town i in
macro-area m is re-elected in election e in year t.24 Observations where the incumbent cannot
be reelected because of a binding term limit are excluded from the regression sample. The
dummy Post is equal to one when election e occurs after the beginning of the Ghost Buildings
program in the town. The coefficients ηm capture post-program period fixed effects that are
specific to the four Italian macro-areas m where town i is located.25 We also include town
fixed effects, φi, and election year fixed effects, φt. Town fixed effects would capture any time-
invariant difference across cities that may be correlated with ghost building intensity. Finally,
Ghost Building Intensityi is the intensity of ghost buildings in town i.
26 The coefficient
of interest, β1, thus captures the differential impact of the Ghost Buildings program on
incumbent reelection by ghost building intensity. Throughout the paper, we cluster standard
errors at the provincial level to allow for spatial correlation in the error term. It should also
be noted that, because of the existence of a two-term limit, our identification relies on mayors
in their first term.
We adopt a similar regression model to study the impact of the program on other electoral
competitiveness outcomes. We focus on four variables: i) the number of candidates running
for mayor; ii) a binary indicator equal to one if the incumbent runs for election a second
time; iii) the difference in the percentage of votes between the first and the second candidate;
and iv) a binary indicator equal to one if a runoff takes place, which occurs in towns with
23As a check, we confirm that, in our prefereed specification (Table IV, Column (7)), the coefficient on
the share of parcels with registered ghost buildings out of the total number of parcels when instrumented by
ghost building intensity is 6.21, significant at the 1 percent level.
24The variable equals zero both if a mayor eligible for reelection does not run again or if she runs again
and is not elected.
25Macro-areas are North, Center, South, Islands.
26Given that booms and busts vary over time, they are not captured by town fixed effects, and they may
be omitted from the model. We verify that all of our results are robust when we control for economic growth.
Results are available upon request.
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more than 15,000 inhabitants when none of the candidates obtain an absolute majority in
the first-round.27
One potential challenge to our identification strategy may arise from the town-specific
timing of publications of the unauthorized buildings lists. On the one hand, if local admin-
istrators had influence over publication dates, unpopular mayors in cities with high evasion
rates might lobby to delay publication. On the other hand, the central government might
push to start the program earlier in those towns with a lower level of tax enforcement. In
both these cases, our estimates of the impact of the Ghost Buildings program on reelection
likelihood may capture a selection effect. We address this concern in several ways. First, as
discussed in Section 2, we note that the timing of the publication was primarily determined at
the provincial level by the availability of digital land registry maps and was highly clustered
by province.28 Only approximately 7 percent of the post-program elections have values for
the post-program indicator different from the one they would have had based on the modal
date of publication in the province.29
To address these discrepancies, we implement an instrumental variable approach. We
code elections based on whether they occur before or after the modal date of publication
of the unauthorized building lists in the province. We then instrument the actual Post
dummy with this binary indicator at the provincial level. The rationale for this choice is
that the provincial level modal inception year may be correlated with historic characteristics
of towns in the province (captured by our town fixed effects), but is unlikely to be driven
by specific mayor characteristics. On the other hand, these may be driving the discrepancies
between the town and the provincial program inception year. We adopt this strategy for
our main specifications.30 In addition, in Appendix Table A.4, we present robustness checks
using alternative instruments for the post-program indicator using the regional and national
modal program inception years. The results are robust to these checks.31
27For the analysis of the difference in percentage votes between the first and second candidate, we always
use first-round results, even for elections when a runoff occurs.
28Appendix Figure A.2 emphasizes the high level of provincial clustering in the publication years.
29It should also be noted that election times are not clustered at the provincial level and therefore there is
a great deal of variation in election years across towns in the same province. We conduct an ANOVA analysis
of elections dates in the last five years of the data (since towns vote every five years). We find that less than
9 percent of the variance is explained by the provincial fixed effects.
30The towns targeted by the program belonged to 101 provinces.
31We also note that our identification does not rely on comparison across towns with different publication
years. In addition, we perform two additional checks related to the timing of program inception. First, we
control for the interaction between the program inception year and the post program variable. Second, we
check that there is no evidence of differential pre-trends in prior reelection rates across towns with different
program inception years. Results are available on request.
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As is standard in difference-in-differences estimation, the identification of the coefficient
of interest relies on two assumptions. The first is the absence of contemporary events that
differentially affected towns with a higher ghost building intensity. We are not aware of other
policies targeting this form of tax evasion that occurred concurrently with the Ghost Buildings
program. However, it is still possible that other events, which differ in intensity by other
variables correlated with ghost building intensity, occurred at the same time. We address
this concern by presenting alternative specifications where we include interactions between a
comprehensive set of geographical, socio-economic, and political controls, all measured before
the beginning of the program, and the post-program binary indicator. The second assumption
is the presence of parallel trends in the outcome variable. We assess this assumption using
several tests and placebo exercises.
5.2 Tax Enforcement and Heterogeneity Analysis
The reduced form approach presented thus far tests whether a higher program scope to
increase tax enforcement at the town level affects incumbent reelection likelihood in the post-
program period. We complement this baseline regression with further analysis to understand
the channels behind this impact. First, we show that it is the tax enforcement induced by
the program that drives the electoral response, as opposed to other potential mechanisms.
For this purpose, we use actual ghost building registration data. In Section 4, we emphasized
several important measurement limitations of these data that warrant caution. With these
caveats in mind, we test whether, for a given intensity of ghost buildings, a higher ghost
building registration rate induced by the program has a positive effect on incumbent reelection
likelihood:
Rimet = γ0 + γ1Postie ·Ghost Building Intensityi
+ γ2Postie ·Registration Ratei + ζm · Postie + µi + µt + υimet
(2)
As discussed above, an obvious threat to the identification of γ2 in Equation 2 arises from
the fact that the registration effort is potentially correlated with many town-level confounders.
We first check the robustness of the results to the inclusion of town and mayoral controls. In
addition, the timing of the program provides a strategy that can alleviate this concern. Even
if the program began in the same year in most of the towns, we can exploit the variation
generated by the fact that Italian municipalities hold elections in different years. A longer
time period between the beginning of the program and the election date naturally leads to
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more registration activities. This generates variation across towns in the registration rate
achieved prior to the local election date that is plausibly uncorrelated with mayor quality. We
use this instrumental variable strategy to examine the impact of a change in the registration
rate on incumbent reelection likelihood.32
Second, we shed light on the channels through which the program could affect voters’ po-
litical preferences. Consistent with the theoretical framework, we investigate the interaction
among the political returns from the enforcement policy, tax culture – the stigma associated
with evading taxes – and local government efficiency in delivering public goods. We use data
from the European Values Study, the European component of the World Values Survey, to
study the role of tax culture. Specifically, we use the answers to the question: “Do you justify
cheating on tax?” Slemrod [2003] uses a similar variable to study the relationship between tax
culture and social capital. We are not aware of other variables that can plausibly capture tax
culture available at the sub-national level in Italy. In this dataset, geographical identification
of respondents is available only at the regional level (19 regions). We thus compute and
standardize region-level means. The following regression model tests whether the electoral
response to the Ghost Buildings program varies by tax evasion tolerance:
Rimet = δ0 + δ1Postie ·Ghost Building Intensityi + δ2Postie · Tax Evasion Tolerancei
+ δ3 · Postie ∗GBi · Tax Evasion Tolerancei + ξm · Postie + λi + λt + νimet,
(3)
where δ3 is the coefficient of interest.
We use the speed of public good provision as a proxy for the quality of public good
delivery at the municipal level. This indicator is measured as the ratio of paid outlays in
the municipal financial report over the total outlays committed in the budget. The rationale
is that the provision of public goods is more effective in places where the actual allocation
delivered to citizens is closer to the amount allocated in the budget. This proxy has already
been used to measure the quality of public goods delivery [Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013;
Grembi, Nannicini and Troiano, 2014]. We are not aware of other proxies that can plausibly
capture the efficiency of the universe of municipal governments in Italy. We compute the
speed of public good provision as the average across two pre-treatment years. The regression
model to capture heterogeneity by this variable is similar to the one presented in Equation
3. Finally, we also assess the impact of the program on town-level public expenditures. To
test whether the program scope to increase tax enforcement affected these expenditures, we
32Consistent with the discussion in Section 5.1, we use the modal inception year at the provincial level to
compute the instrument.
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adopt a specification similar to the one presented in Equation 1, using the natural logarithm
of the local government expenditures as the dependent variable.
6 Results
6.1 Baseline Results
In this section, we investigate the electoral consequences of the Ghost Buildings program.
Figure V provides a visual analysis of the relationship between ghost building intensity and
changes in the incumbent reelection likelihood – our main outcome variable – after the
beginning of the program. On the x-axis, the ghost building intensity is partitioned into
percentiles. The scatterplot displays a clear increasing relationship.33
Table IV formalizes this analysis above and presents the results of the difference-in-
differences estimation discussed in Section 5. Column (1) reports the basic OLS specification
(“Reduced Form”) using the provincial post-program indicator. The coefficient remains
stable with the addition of town fixed effects (Column (2)) and election year fixed effects
(Column (3)). Including a rich set of town-level covariates interacted with the post-program
dummy does not change the results (Column (4)).34 Starting in Column (5), we instrument
the post-program indicator with the provincial post-program indicator. The coefficient is sta-
ble across the different specifications. Again, the results are robust to the inclusion of year
fixed effects, town fixed effects, and interaction among town controls and the post-program
indicator, in Columns (6)-(8), respectively.35
In Column (7), the baseline specification for the rest of the analysis, the reported coeffi-
cient on the interaction between ghost building intensity and the post-program indicator is
1.042, significant at 1 percent. This magnitude implies that a one standard deviation increase
in the town-level program scope to increase enforcement, as measured by the ghost building
intensity, raises the likelihood of the incumbent’s reelection by approximately 2.2 percentage
points in post-program elections, relative to pre-program ones (from a sample mean of 45.4
percent). A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the effect of a one standard devi-
ation increase in Ghost Buildings program scope on incumbent reelection probability is on
the order of magnitude of 6 percent of the incumbency effect in U.S. House elections [Lee,
33Appendix Figure A.2 presents a placebo version of Figure V.
34Our results are similar when using natural logarithms instead of levels for some of the controls.
35Appendix Table A.3 presents several additional robustness checks. We show that the results are robust to
the inclusion of additional town controls (interacted with the post-program indicator), trimming procedures,
alternative sample definitions, and normalization measures.
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2008].
In Figure VI, we check whether towns with different levels of evasion were on different
trends in the probability of incumbent reelection before the treatment. We report point
estimates and confidence intervals on ghost building intensity for each of the elections pre-
and post-program. The figure shows that, before the Ghost Buildings program started, the
probability of reelection of the incumbent was independent of tax evasion. However, after the
beginning of the program there is a statistically and economically significant impact. Thus,
the coefficient pattern in Figure VI suggests that the common trend assumption holds in our
setting. One potential concern is that because of the term limit rule, we only include towns
with first-term mayors. However, if the results were purely explained by composition, one
would expect large jumps in reelection rates even in pre-program elections. The lack of such
cyclical changes in our pre-trends graph attenuates the concerns arising from the fact that
the composition of towns change. Additionally, it is encouraging that our results in Table IV
are robust to the inclusion of a rich set of controls interacted with the post-program dummy:
if the sample composition were driving the observed effects, we would expect the inclusion
of the town covariates to substantially reduce the estimates.
In addition, we conduct a placebo check based on the fact that the program was not
implemented in the Trentino Alto-Adige region. We first impute the value of the ghost
building intensity by using the results in Table II. We then perform a Triple Difference
Estimator (DDD), where we augment our research design with the difference between the
reelection rate of Trentino Alto-Adige before and after the treatment. The main coefficient
of interest in this research design is statistically significant and statistically indistinguishable
from our main effect. We report the results in Appendix Table A.6.
In Table V, we study the impact of the program on other measures of election compet-
itiveness, as described in Section 5, using a regression strategy analogous to Table IV. For
each of these variables, we report the specifications used in Columns (7) and (8) of Table
IV. An increase in ghost building intensity reduces the competitiveness of local elections.
Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in ghost building intensity reduces the number
of candidates by 1.8 percent of the sample mean. In addition, it increases the likelihood
that the incumbent runs again by 4.1 percent, though this effect is smaller and no longer
significant when including other controls (Column 4). A one standard-deviation increase in
ghost building intensity also increases the margin of victory by 3.4 percent and reduces the
likelihood of a runoff by 18 percent (this variable is only defined in towns with population
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above 15 thousands).36
The combination of the above results is consistent with the idea that both the incumbent
mayor and other potential candidates correctly anticipate a stronger incumbent advantage
as a result of the program.37 This in equilibrium shapes the actual election competiveness
and the incumbent reelection prospects.38
6.2 Tax Enforcement, Tax Culture and Efficiency of Local Gov-
ernments
This section elaborates on some of the potential channels through which the anti-evasion
program could increase voter support for the incumbent. Table VI presents the results from
the estimation of Equation 2. This step aims at showing that the increase in tax enforcement
induced by the program – the ghost buildings registration – drove the electoral response.
In Column (1), we present the correlation between the ghost building registration rate and
the likelihood of incumbent reelection. We find that, controlling for ghost building intensity,
a one standard deviation increase in ghost building registration rate (0.18) raises reelection
likelihood by 3.1 percentage points. In Column (2), we show that adding the interaction
between town- and mayor-level controls and the post-program indicator does not change the
results. In Column (3), we show that in a cross-city regression, the number of years elapsed
from the program start date are a strong predictor of the city-level registration rate. This
can be interpreted as a first stage for our instrumental variable approach.
In Columns (4) and (5), we use the years elapsed since the program start date as an
instrument for the registration rate imputable to the incumbent administration.39 In the IV
36Appendix Figure A.4 shows that the parallel trend assumption also holds for the other political outcome
variables described above.
37Following suggestions from two Referees, we also looked at voter turnout and found no significant impact
of the program on this outcome variable.
38The set of our results thus implies that a share of the reelection effect can be explained by the (endogenous)
decision to rerun. For instance, incumbents may be more likely to rerun given the increase in town revenues
generated by both phases of the the program (i.e., before and after the April 2011 deadline). Since the
choice to run is endogenous, the impact of the program on the likelihood of incumbent victory conditional
on re-running is not easily identifiable. It should also be noted that the baseline means of the reelected and
rerun variables are different, and that not every mayor that decides to rerun ends up winning the election. A
simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, assuming that the probability of winning conditional on re-running
for the incumbent is at the sample mean of 79.4 percent, suggests that at most 67 percent of our reelection
effect can be explained by the re-running effect.
39In this IV specification we do not control for year fixed effects. Three quarters of the post-program
elections come from cities that started the program in 2007. Thus, we lose statistical significance when
running this specification, although it is reassuring that the coefficient of interest remains positive and large.
Results are available upon request.
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specification, a one standard deviation increase in the registration rate raises the reelection
likelihood by 11.3 percentage points in post-program elections. Finally, in Column (5) we
show that the IV estimate is unchanged when adding the interaction between town-level
controls and the post-program indicator.40 Even if our instrument is uncorrelated with any
idiosyncratic city-specific characteristics, we are unable to rule out the possibility that having
the program for longer time has an independent effect on its impact on the probability of
reelection, which would invalidate the IV strategy. While we acknowledge this possibility, we
still believe that our instrument performs well in addressing the main endogeneity concern for
the registration efforts of the mayors (which may depend on the mayor’s ability or incentives).
We then provide empirical evidence on the role of tax culture and local government
efficiency in shaping the political returns to enforcement. Table VII presents the results from
the estimation of Equation 3. The coefficient of interest, δ3, captures the impact on the
electoral response to the program of a standard-deviation increase in the variables measuring
either the tolerance for tax evasion or the municipal speed of public goods provision. In
Column (1), we show that a one standard deviation increase in the score measuring tolerance
for tax evasion reduces the point estimate of the impact of ghost buildings on reelection by .64
(significant at the ten percent level). Column (2) shows that the magnitude of the coefficient
is stable, or if anything, increases (in absolute value) when adding the triple interactions with
macro-area dummies.41
Turning to local government efficiency, in Column (3) we find that a one standard devia-
tion increase in the speed of public good provision increases the point estimate of the impact
of ghost buildings on reelection by 0.63 and that this coefficient is statistically significant at
the ten percent level. We then confirm that this interaction effect does not simply capture
geographical variation in the responsiveness across different parts of Italy by adding triple
interactions across the post-program indicator, the ghost building intensity, and the macro
area dummies. The sign and economic significance of the coefficient is robust (Column (4)),
although estimated less precisely (p-value=.137). To summarize, while the limited power
in these estimates should evoke some caution, the analysis presents evidence that voters’
responses depend on underlying tax morale and government spending efficiency.
Finally, Table VIII presents the results of the estimation of the baseline regression model
in Equation 1, using the log of town-level government expenditures. Column (1) presents the
40The results on the registration rate regressions are robust to the checks presented in Table A.3. Results
are available upon request.
41Standard errors are similar when performing region-level cluster bootstrapping, following Cameron, Gel-
bach and Miller [2008].
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reduced-form results, using the post-program indicator based on the provincial mode. The
point estimate is .436 (significant at 10 percent). The coefficient is stable when instrumenting
the post-program indicator with the provincial one and is slightly larger when including
interactions among town-level controls and the post-program indicator (Columns (2) and
(3)). While the effect of the program is statistically significant, we also note that it is fairly
small. A one standard-deviation increase in ghost-building intensity increases expenditures
by approximately 1 percent. We believe that it is unlikely that this effect explains the
entirety of the incumbent reelection effect we documented earlier in the paper. Consistent
with the suggestive evidence provided by the heterogeneity in tax culture, we suggest that
non-monetary factors (e.g., the direct utility non-evaders derive from catching the shirkers)
must play an important role.
6.3 Alternative Explanations
Our results suggest that the increase in tax enforcement induced by the program drives
the results on voting support for the local incumbents. In this section, we show that this
channel more than offsets several alternative potential explanations about the impact of the
Ghost Buildings program.
First, the publication of the number of ghost buildings could generate information about
the incumbent. We believe this to be both unlikely and inconsistent with our findings. The
number of ghost buildings is a slow moving stock variable that is likely to have accumulated
over decades, rather than a reflection of only the most recent years. Most of the buildings
found by the Agenzia del Territorio were not newly constructed. The existence of a term
limit and the fact that the average time to complete a building in Italy is longer than most
other OECD countries suggest that most of these buildings were built before the incumbent’s
election. Second, we note that voters who could potentially receive information from the
publication are most likely the ones who were not evading before the program, as evaders
were already aware of their own evasion.
Keeping this premise in mind, we believe our results rule out this alternative explanation.
In one version of this alternative story, voters, after learning about low levels of evasion de-
tected by the program, reward the current mayor for having properly enforced tax payment in
the past. This hypothesis predicts a negative impact of the detected ghost building intensity
on incumbent reelection in post-program elections, and as such it is obviously inconsistent
with our baseline results.
In another version of this alternative explanation, voters reward an incumbent mayor
22
 at U
niversitaet Zuerich on N
ovem
ber 15, 2016
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
for having allowed high levels of evasion in the past. First, this contradicts the intuition
mentioned above that non-evaders, rather than those who previously evaded, are the ones who
are potentially acquiring new information. Second, this is unlikely because the purpose of the
program, and therefore the publication, was to shut down the evasion opportunity. Third, it
is at odds with the fact that the positive impact of program intensity on incumbent reelection
is lower in regions with higher tolerance for tax evasion. Fourth, it is also inconsistent with
the result that towns with higher registration levels are more likely, rather than less likely,
to reelect an incumbent mayor.
In a second potential alternative explanation, the program gives the incumbent an elec-
toral rent by allowing her to not register the targeted ghost buildings, for instance, by re-
porting errors in the results generated by the mapping process.42 If this were the prevailing
mechanism, we would expect the positive impact of the program to be stronger in regions
with a higher tolerance for tax evasion, but we find the opposite to be the case. In addition,
such an explanation is inconsistent with the result that a higher share of registered ghost
buildings at the time of a local election increases the reelection likelihood.
Third, one concern is that mayors from towns with low ghost building intensity may step
to higher level positions, as models of career concerns could predict. We note this is unlikely
to generate the large results we find in our data since the level of these transitions is generally
low. In addition, we collect data on the elected members of Provincial and Regional Coun-
cils and Italian and European Parliaments. We confirm that the Ghost Buildings program
intensity does not affect significantly the likelihood that an incumbent mayor holds any of
these seats within three years from the end of his appointment (Appendix Table A.5).
To summarize, the empirical results provide strong evidence that it is the additional tax
enforcement induced by the program that drives the increase in the reelection prospects of
the incumbent, as opposed to these alternative explanations.
7 Conclusion
A rapidly growing literature shows that interventions that improve the technology of
tax enforcement – third-party reporting, cross-checking, or better auditing algorithms – can
substantially reduce tax evasion. Yet, political incentives to adopt these technologies are also
of crucial importance. Policymakers will delay or prevent enforcement policies if they are
42For example, the press agency of the mayor of a town in our sample, Capaccio Paestum, explicitly
criticized the excessive media attention to the program, indicating that the unregistered buildings in that
city were unregistered due to citizens’ needs [Comune di Capaccio Paestum, 2010.]
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bound to lose support because of them. In spite of this, little is known about the electoral
impact of fighting tax evasion. This paper provides evidence of a positive interaction between
technological improvements in tax-payer monitoring and political incentives. Specifically,
local incumbents obtain positive political returns – an increase in their reelection likelihood
– from the Ghost Buildings program, a nationwide anti-evasion policy in Italy that was based
on a novel enforcement technology.
The underlying tax culture, broadly defined as the individual propensity and social norms
determining evasion for a given level of technology, is another important determinant of tax
compliance. It shapes the enforcement level a government can achieve for a given enforcement
technology. We show that tax culture affects the political returns to undertaking anti-evasion
policies. The increase in incumbent reelection probabilities in response to the Ghost Buildings
program is larger in areas with a lower self-reported tolerance for tax evasion. Finally, we
document that the political returns to enforcement policies are higher when the government
is more efficient in providing public goods.
These findings have two important policy implications. First, they provide a framework
for thinking about the political feasibility of policies that increase the visibility of tax evasion,
thus lowering monitoring costs and increasing policymakers’ incentives to improve enforce-
ment. This has immediate relevance for special interest politics. Concentrated evader groups
might effectively lobby to keep evasion hidden from the public, but they are unlikely to be
able to punish an incumbent who enforces tax compliance after the evasion becomes broadly
visible.
Second, there is potential complementarity among anti-evasion policies, government re-
sponsiveness, and social preferences for tax compliance. Governments that plan to implement
novel enforcement policies should concurrently attempt to strengthen their capabilities, for
instance, by improving the speed at which they respond to citizen’s needs, or by increasing
the social stigma associated with tax evasion. This complementarity will likely increase the
returns politicians obtain from anti-evasion policies and will thus make such policies better
aligned with political agents’ incentives.
We are aware that using an identification strategy based on a specific natural experiment
enhances the internal validity of our study but may come at the price of lower external
validity, concerning other countries or other taxes. Yet, we speculate that evidence of positive
political returns to anti-evasion policies in Italy, a country often cited as an example of poor
tax culture, could be a lower bound for other OECD countries. We believe an interesting goal
for future work would be to elucidate the potential non-linearity in the relationship between
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the prevalence of tax evasion and political returns to enforcement policies. In addition, we
believe that complementarity between enforcement policies and social norms on evasion could
potentially be relevant for policy design in other regions of the world.
Another important dimension of external validity concerns enforcement policies targeting
other types of evasion. One of the merits of the Ghost Buildings program is that it detected
the entire stock of evasion. In contrast, the effectiveness of policies targeting other tax-
concealing activities might vary according to the ability of the specific evader to hide, which
might, in turn, affect how the public would respond. We hope future work will shed light on
the political returns to other enforcement policies around the world.
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Tables
Table I: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A: Ghost Building Town Variables
Ghost Building Intensity 0.027 0.021 0 0.187 7720
Registered Ghost Building Intensity (Apr 2011) 0.006 0.006 0 0.051 7720
Ghost Building Registration Rate (Apr 2011) 0.243 0.181 0 1 7720
Panel B: Geographic Town Variables
Town Area Size (sq km) 37.044 50.096 0.2 1307.71 7720
Altitude (mt) 510.584 461.487 0 3072.5 7720
Land Registry Parcels (1,000) 10.776 13.278 0.001 514.372 7720
Panel C: Socio-Economic Town Variables
Population (1,000) 7.225 40.23 0.033 2546.804 7720
Disposable Income per capita (1,000 Euros) 13.449 3.042 5.013 44.949 7720
Urbanization Index 1.619 0.684 1 3 7720
Non-Profit Associations/1,000 pop 5.293 3.912 0.212 81.218 7720
Number of Firms per capita 0.076 0.027 0.018 0.344 7720
Panel D: Mayor Variables
Mayor Age 49.03 9.5 21 83 7720
Mayor Education 3.29 0.69 1 5 7720
Mayor Born Same City (0/1) 0.47 0.49 0 1 7720
Mayor Term Number 1.3 0.46 1 2 7720
Mayor Woman (0/1) 0.1 0.3 0 1 7720
Panel E: Election Panel Variables
Term Limit Indicator (0/1) 0.201 0.401 0 1 32422
Post Program Election (0/1) 0.143 0.351 0 1 25893
Years Elapsed since Program Inception (= 0 if ≤ 0) 0.299 0.802 0 4 25893
Incumbent Reelection (0/1) 0.454 0.498 0 1 25893
N. Candidates 2.761 1.301 1 17 24585
Incumbent Rerun (0/1) 0.572 0.495 0 1 25525
Victory Margin 25.999 26.942 0 100 23933
Runoff (0/1) 0.525 0.499 0 1 2285
Notes: Socio-Economic Town Variables are collected before the Ghost Buildings program inception.
Mayor Variables refer to characteristics of the incumbent mayor at the time of program inception. Summary
statistics for the Election Panel Variables are reported for the subsample of elections with no binding
term limit, except for Term Limit Indicator. In all the tables, we replace missing values for the town-level
controls with regional means, so to retain a constant sample size. The range of missing values across variables
spans from 0 to 3.8%. The results are unchanged if, for each covariate, we add a dummy equal to one for
a missing value, instead. A detailed description and source of each variable is provided in Appendix Tables
A.1 and A.2.
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Table II: The Determinants of Ghost Building Intensity (per 1,000 land parcels)
(1) (2) (3)
Town Area Size (sq km) 0.102∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.015) (0.012)
Altitude (mt) -0.015∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Land Registry Parcels (1,000) -0.236∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.070) (0.047)
Population (1,000) 0.020 0.004
(0.016) (0.011)
Disposable Income per capita (1,000 Euros) -2.598∗∗∗ -1.224∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.292)
Urbanization Index 5.940∗∗∗ 4.404∗∗∗
(1.837) (1.652)
Non-Profit Associations/1,000 pop -0.463∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.074)
Number of Firms per capita 56.244∗∗∗ 89.886∗∗∗
(20.100) (17.828)
Region FE X
Observations 7720 7720 7720
Notes: The dependent variable is the town-level ghost building intensity per thousand of parcels, defined
as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land
registry parcels, multiplied by one thousand. The mean of the dependent variable is 26.69. Standard errors
are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table III: The Determinants of the Ghost Building Registration Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Mayor Age -0.066∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019)
Mayor Education 0.802∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.271) (0.239)
Mayor Born Same City (0/1) 1.054∗∗ 1.128∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗
(0.424) (0.425) (0.411)
Mayor Term Number -0.201 -0.083 -0.082
(0.355) (0.341) (0.351)
Mayor Woman (0/1) -0.915 -1.223∗ -1.185∗
(0.637) (0.625) (0.608)
Geographic Controls X X
Socio-Economic Controls X
Observations 7720 7720 7720
Notes: The dependent variable is the town-level ghost building registration rate (multiplied by 100),
defined as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings that get registered by
April 2011 and the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings identified at the beginning of the
program, multiplied by 100. The mean of the dependent variable is 24.32. Refer to Table I for a description
of the Geographic and Socio-Economic Controls. All the regressions include regional fixed effects and year-
of-program-inception fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05,
***p<0.01.
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Table IV: Ghost Building Intensity and Incumbent Reelection: Baseline Results
Reduced Form 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post 1.097∗∗∗ 1.114∗∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗∗
(0.358) (0.373) (0.378) (0.376)
Ghost Building Intensity*Province Post 1.083∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.358) (0.360) (0.359)
Town FE X X X X X X
Election Year FE X X X X
Town Controls*Post X X
Observations 25893 25893 25893 25893 25893 25893 25893 25893
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the incumbent mayor is reelected
(mean 0.454). Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program
inception. Province Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings
program modal inception year in the province. In the columns grouped under the header “2SLS”, Post is
instrumented with Post Province. Ghost Building Intensity is defined as the ratio between the number
of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels. All the columns
include an interaction between macro-areas fixed effects and either Province Post (Columns (1)-(4)) or Post
(Columns (5)-(8)). Columns (1) and (5) include the Ghost Building Intensity level. Town Controls*Post
include town-level controls interacted with the Post dummy. Refer to Table I for a list of these variables.
The regression sample includes all the elections between 1993 and 2011 in which the incumbent does not face
a binding term-limit. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table V: Ghost Building Intensity and Election Competitiveness
N. Candidates Incumbent Rerun Victory Margin Runoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post Program -2.383∗∗ -3.155∗∗∗ 1.115∗∗ 0.610 42.063 41.882∗ -4.502∗∗∗ -4.271∗∗∗
(1.057) (1.152) (0.457) (0.437) (25.984) (23.614) (1.383) (1.282)
Dependent Variable Mean 2.761 2.761 0.572 0.572 25.999 25.999 0.525 0.525
Town Controls*Post X X X X
Observations 24441 24441 25483 25483 23562 23562 2216 2216
Notes: N. Candidates is the number of candidates running for election. Incumbent Rerun is a binary indicator equal to one when the current incumbent
runs for reelection. Victory Margin is the percentage point difference between the first and the second candidate in the elections (we use first-round percentages
even for towns with a runoff). Runoff is a binary indicator, defined only for towns with more than 15,000 inhabitants, equal to one if the election requires a
runoff. This occurs if the first candidate in the first round receives less than 50% of the votes. Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs
after the Ghost Buildings program inception. In all the columns, Post is instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs
after the modal program inception year in the province. Ghost Building Intensity is defined as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with
ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels. All the regressions include town fixed effects, election-year fixed effects and an interaction between
macro-areas fixed effects and Post. Town Controls*Post include town-level controls interacted with the Post dummy. Refer to Table I for a list of these
variables. The regression sample includes all the elections between 1993 and 2011 in which the incumbent does not face a binding term-limit. Standard errors
are clustered at provincial level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table VI: Ghost Building Registration and Incumbent Reelection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS 1st Stage 2SLS 2SLS
Ghost Building Registration Rate*Post 0.173∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.069) (0.196) (0.197)
Years Elapsed since Program Inception 0.077∗∗∗
(0.009)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post 1.276∗∗∗ 1.423∗∗∗ 1.561∗∗∗ 1.904∗∗∗
(0.383) (0.408) (0.391) (0.448)
Town Controls*Post X X
Observations 25893 25893 7720 25893 25893
Notes: Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) present election-panel regressions where the dependent variable is
a binary indicator equal to one if the incumbent mayor is reelected (mean 0.454). Post is a binary indicator
equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program inception. In all the columns, Post is
instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the modal program
inception year in the province. Ghost Building Intensity is defined as the ratio between the number of
land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry parcels. Registration
Rate refers to the registration rate at April 2011 in columns (1) and (2) and to the instrumented imputed
registration rate at the time of the election in columns (4) and (5). The regressions include town fixed
effects, an interaction between macro-areas fixed effects and Post and, in the OLS specifications, year fixed
effects. The regression sample for these columns includes all the elections between 1993 and 2011 in which the
incumbent does not face a binding term-limit. Extra Controls*Post include town-level controls interacted
with the Post dummy. Refer to Table I for a list of these variables.
Column (3), First Stage, presents cross-town regressions where the dependent variable is the ghost building
registration rate at April 2011. The variable Years Elapsed since Program Inception measures the
years elapsed between the program inception year and 2011. The regression includes the levels of the above
controls, the level of the ghost building intensity and macro-areas fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at provincial level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table VII: Ghost Building Intensity and Incumbent Reelec-
tion: Heterogeneity Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post 1.063∗∗∗ 1.311∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗ 1.229∗
(0.380) (0.668) (0.391) (0.682)
...*Justify Tax Cheating -0.639∗ -0.734∗
(0.364) (0.404)
...*Speed of Public Good Provision 0.627∗ 0.592
(0.380) (0.397)
GBI*Macro Area*Post No Yes No Yes
Observations 25893 25893 25893 25893
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the incumbent mayor is reelected
(mean 0.454). Post is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program
inception. In all the columns, Post is instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal to one if the
election occurs after the modal program inception year in the province. Ghost Building Intensity is
defined as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number
of land registry parcels. GBI*Macro Area*Post is the triple interaction among macro-areas fixed effect,
ghost building intensity and Post. All the regressions include town fixed effects, election-year fixed effects,
interactions between macro-areas fixed effects and Post, and an interaction between the relevant heterogeneity
variable for the column and Post. The regression sample includes all the elections between 1993 and 2011 in
which the incumbent does not face a binding term-limit. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table VIII: Local Government Expenditures
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Ghost Buildings Intensity * Post 0.497∗ 0.621∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.206)
Ghost Building Intensity*Post Province 0.441∗
(0.253)
Extra Controls*Post No No Yes
Observations 74664 74664 74664
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of municipal government expenditures. Post
is a binary indicator equal to one if the election occurs after the Ghost Buildings program inception. In
columns (2) and (3), Post is instrumented by Province Post, a binary indicator equal to one if the election
occurs after the modal program inception year in the province. Ghost Building Intensity is defined as the
ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings and the total number of land registry
parcels. Town Controls*Post include town level controls interacted with the Post dummy. Refer to Table
I for a list of these variables. All the regressions include town fixed effects, election-year fixed effects and an
interaction between macro-areas fixed effects and Post. Standard errors are clustered at provincial level. *
p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Figures
Figure I: Number of Elections per Year
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Notes: The figure shows, for each calendar year, the number of elections held before and after the inception
of the Ghost Buildings program.
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Figure II: Ghost Building Intensity (per 1,000 land registry parcels)
Notes: In this figure, Ghost Building Intensity is defined as the number of land registry parcels with ghost
buildings per thousand of land registry parcels. White areas identify towns with missing data.
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Figure III: Ghost Building Registration Rate
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Notes: The histogram shows the distribution of the ghost building registration rate at April 30, 2011, defined
as the ratio between the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings that get registered by this date
and the number of land registry parcels with ghost buildings identified by the program.
Figure IV: Registered Ghost Building Intensity
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Notes: The scatter plots the relation between the fraction of land parcels with ghost buildings that get
registered by April 2011 (Registered Ghost Building Intensity) and the fraction of land parcels with ghost
buildings identified by the program (Ghost Building Intensity). The x-axis is partitioned into percentiles.
The x-axis of each dot is the median value of the ghost building intensity in the percentile. The y-axis is the
average value of the registered ghost building intensity in the percentile. We cut the top 1% of the x-axis
values from the graph. The line plots the predicted values from a linear regression model.
42
 at U
niversitaet Zuerich on N
ovem
ber 15, 2016
http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Figure V: Difference in reelection rates pre- to post- Ghost Buildings program
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Notes: The scatter plots the relation between the change in the average (year-demeaned) reelection rate
between the pre-program and the post-program periods and the Ghost Building Intensity. The x-axis is
partitioned into percentiles. The x-axis of each dot is the median value of the ghost building intensity in the
percentile. The y-axis is the average value of the change in the reelection rate in the percentile. We cut the
top 1% of the x-axis values from the graph. The sample includes elections in which the incumbent does not
face a binding term-limit. The line plots the predicted values from a linear regression model.
Figure VI: Ghost Building Intensity Coefficient by Election Pre/Post Program
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Notes: The graph reports the coefficients on the ghost building intensity for each election before and after
the beginning of the Ghost Buildings program. On the x-axis, elections are ranked based on their occurrence
relative to the program. The regression includes town and year fixed effects. The sample includes elections in
which the incumbent does not face a binding term-limit. For each election rank, we report the point estimate
and the 95% confidence interval. The election before the program (“-1”) is the omitted category, for which
confidence interval is obtained as the mean of the confidence interval width in election -2 and election +1.
The modal number of years between elections is five years between 1993 and 2001, and four afterwards.
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